Leonardo da Vinci on nature: knowledge and representation by Frosini, Fabio & Nova, Alessandro
11
fabio frosini, alessandro nova
LEONARDO DA VINCI ON NATURE:
KNOWLEDGE AND REPRESENTATION
1. The subject of this book, Leonardo da Vinci on Nature, requires some
preliminary remarks. On the one hand, these remarks refer to the im-
age of Leonardo in the history of culture, and on the other, to the state 
of studies concerning his thought. There is, of course, a relationship be-
tween these two fields, even if this link is strangely weak in Leonardo’s 
case, much weaker than for most Italian Renaissance authors. Leonardo’s 
public image, given over to the myth of the ‘genius’ and nowadays mar-
keted in countless ways, is powered by a current of popular belief which 
is now unstoppable. This revolves around certain mythologems that are 
the fragmented residues of interpretations set out in different periods of 
Leonardo’s critical reception. This image therefore mingles – just like a 
museum of fossils – relics from different periods and various backgrounds: 
from the ‘magician’ to the technician able to anticipate almost all modern 
inventions, from the fanatic worshipper of science to the esoteric painter 
of symbols and hidden truths, with all possible variations in between. Col-
lective efforts that have attempted to reconcile scientific rigour with gen-
eral interest, such as the recent exhibition on The Mind of Leonardo. The 
Universal Genius at Work1, have not decisively broken up this rich stream of 
mythical images, which therefore become increasingly distanced from the 
mainstream flow of studies concerning Leonardo2.
1 Cf. The Mind of Leonardo. The Universal Genius at Work, ed. by P. Galluzzi, Firenze 
2006.
2 F. Capra’s book is one of the most recent examples of the ‘mythical’ use of Leonardo, 
attempting to give a coherent presentation of his thought as the anticipation of a ‘holistic’ 
science, The Science of Leonardo: Inside the Mind of a Great Genius of the Renaissance, New 
York 2008, translated into five languages.
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For all the reasons just given, a theme such as Leonardo on Nature is 
thus highly ambivalent and can result in more than one misinterpreta-
tion. From the point of view of Leonardo’s public image, talking about 
‘nature’ means being caught in a dilemma with no way out. On one hand, we 
are dragged towards the nineteenth-century celebration of the struggle against 
nature, i.e., a ‘technical’ idea which is not only out of step with Leonardo’s 
time, but now found completely obsolete when bearing in mind the changes 
undergone not just by the debate on technology during the twentieth cen-
tury, but also by its own reality3. On the other hand, we fall into the ac-
ritical exaltation of ‘nature’ as a mystical-religious reservoir of all meaning 
and value; a representation which in fact is not particularly different from 
a simple anthropomorphic reflection.
2. This is precisely the alternative that has gradually been neutralised, i.e. 
proved false and lacking any historical basis, over the course of interpreta-
tions of Leonardo’s thought concerning nature. This can be appreciated if 
we briefly consider the main studies concerning Leonardo’s natural philoso-
phy written since the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1905 Edmondo 
Solmi, in his Nuovi studi sulla filosofia naturale di Leonardo da Vinci4, al-
beit within a comprehensive approach of a positivistic character, identified 
analogy as the key to accessing the method used by Leonardo to study the 
work of nature. This led him to postulate a necessary connection between 
the concept of ‘spirit’, optics and the theory of light, acoustics and mechan-
ics5. In fact, Solmi’s reputation is due principally to his scholarly  research 
concerning Leonardo’s ‘sources’6, while this hermeneutic proposal remained 
buried in the pages of a marginal book for a long time with practically no 
influence within the history of interpretation. However, the idea that the 
code and the ‘style’ of thought peculiar to Leonardo should be identified 
in the specific manner of using the analogy between natural phenomena of 
different order and scale – which Solmi called the «theory of undulations»7 
– grasps a point that subsequently, even though in an independent manner 
from Solmi’s interpretation, has gradually been confirmed.
In the large work by Lynn Thorndike concerning Magic and Experimen-
tal Science, the chapter devoted to Leonardo (The ‘Magician’ of the Renais-
sance) depicts a path that goes from natural magic to an approach that 
Thorndike broadly defines as Aristotelian, and more particularly as physi-
cal and materialistic8. This is an interesting chapter9, but quite below the 
expectations legitimately raised by the overall discussion of this monumen-
tal work, which in most places draws a structural analogy between optics, 
magic-astrology and the study of natural laws, in authors ranging from the 
ninth to the fifteenth centuries10. De facto, Solmi’s insight recognized the 
presence of a much older metaphysical approach within Leonardo, but one 
which was still very much alive in the fifteenth century, which considered 
light as a primary phenomenon in the production of natural reality and an 
example in terms of studying the laws that governed it. Thorndike was not 
unaware of the presence of this background in Leonardo’s thought11, but 
3 Just think of the way in which ecology has emerged as the science controlling the com-
munity/environment cycle, beyond and against the various ‘green’ ideologies. We confine 
ourselves to mentioning three studies: L. Trepl, Geschichte der Ökologie. Vom 17. Jahrhun-
dert bis zur Gegenwart, Frankfurt am Main 1987; P. Acot, Histoire de l’écologie, Paris 1988; 
F. Dagognet, Nature, Paris 1990.
4 E. Solmi, Nuovi studi sulla filosofia naturale di Leonardo da Vinci: il metodo sperimen-
tale, l’astronomia, la teoria della visione, Mantova 1905. This book contains three studies: 
«Leonardo da Vinci e il metodo sperimentale nelle ricerche fisiche» (pp. 7-74), «Leonardo 
da Vinci astronomo» (pp. 75-136), and «Leonardo da Vinci e la teoria della visione» (pp. 
137-218).
5 Cf. Solmi, 1905 (as in n. 4), pp. 147-157.
6 His essays, published in 1908 (Le fonti dei manoscritti di Leonardo da Vinci. Contributi, 
Torino 1908 [Supplement to the Giornale storico della letteratura italiana]) and in 1911 
(«Nuovi contributi alle Fonti dei Manoscritti di Leonardo da Vinci», in: Giornale storico 
della letteratura italiana», lviii, 1911, pp. 297-358), are now collected in id., Scritti vinciani, 
Firenze 1976.
7 «The theory of the undulations in Leonardo is a wonderful example of what analogy 
can do in science» (Solmi, 1905 [as in n. 4], p. 155).
8 L. Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science, Vols. v-vi: The Sixteenth 
Century, New York 1941, Vol. V, p. 36.
9 Thorndike, 1941 (as in n. 8), Vol. v, pp. 16-36.
10 Cf. L. Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science, Vols. i-ii: During the 
First Thirteen Centuries of Our Era, New York 1923, Vol. i, pp. 642-646 (al-Kindi), Vol. 
ii, pp. 258 (Pseudo-Aristotle), 443-444 (Grosseteste), 454-446 (Witelo), 667 (R. Bacon). 
Cf. also L. Thorndike A History of Magic and Experimental Science, Vols. iii-iv: Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Centuries, New York 1934, Vol. iii, pp. 598-599 (Matteo Guarimberto from 
Parma, xv cent.).
11 Thorndike, 1941 (as in n. 8), p. 24: «In Leonardo’s discussion of perspective the same 
conception of pyramids of rays is prominent which had appeared far back in Alkindi and 
Roger Bacon and often in the interim».
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he was far from being able to deduce al its conclusions. After him, Gra-
ziela Federici Vescovini and David Lindberg undertook further studies of 
this tradition, which may be grouped under the idea of an ‘ontological’ 
concept of perspective12, and it was inaly studied once again in relation to 
Leonardo by Romano Nanni, who spoke of a kind of «radial ontology»13.
Studies concerning Leonardo from the opposite aspect, i.e. that of 
mechanics, gradualy reached the same conclusion. The book by Cesare 
Luporini on La mente di Leonardo, published in 1953, which in many ways 
was already ‘dated’, clearly identiies – precisely in connection with a per-
tinent reference to Solmi’s old book – both the organic link between the 
ields of optics and mechanics and more generaly the function which this 
analogy holds in Leonardo’s thought «not just as an instrument of discov-
ery, in order to establish new connections, but also to discard the appear-
ance or limit its scope where it proves to be completely or partialy unten-
able within the critical proces»14. These suggestions would subsequently 
be resumed – but not connected to previous studies – by Kenneth Keele 
and Martin Kemp15. It is mainly thanks to the succes of Kemp’s book 
(published in 1981) that the link between perspective and mechanics, and 
between art and science, is today considered as the consolidated basis for 
studying Leonardo’s thought.
3. Talking about Leonardo on Nature these days therefore means a con-
frontation with the problems that we have briely tried to ilustrate. In this 
light, ‘nature’ is never, in Leonardo’s scripts, a purely pasive and mechani-
cal substrate, to be addresed from a superior technical point of view given 
as a distinguishing feature of human civilisation (as subsequent science in 
the seventeenth century would do); nor can it take on the wraparound traits 
of a mystical background, where diferences end up vanishing or recuring 
esotericaly (as would stil happen in many Neoplatonic texts of the 16th 
century). The elements of magic and astrology present in Leonardo – as in 
many of his contemporaries – do not equate with irationalism, nor with 
an arid rationalism. They are part of a comprehensive reference system with 
which Leonardo – not alone in this, either – tries to build an approach 
able to lead the most varied and disparate natural phenomena back to a 
common measure of readability. What is special in the case of Leonardo, is, 
if anything, the way in which research concerning him has gradualy recog-
nised the dual intertwining between art and science, and between theoreti-
cal knowledge and its technical and operational translation (with a strong 
emphasis on the isue of calculation and measurement). Al of this, though, 
does not exclude the posible philosophical or metaphysical signiicance of 
his thought in any way, provided one does not succumb to a narow and 
impoverished notion of what constitutes ‘philosophy’ and its history.
We can symbolicaly date the beginning of the focus on the peculiarity 
of Leonardo’s approach to nature, as a consequence of the traits that bind 
him to a longstanding tradition, to Ernst H. Gombrich’s esay The Form of 
Movement in Water and Air16. The importance of this paper can hardly be 
exaggerated, given that it opened up, in a single stroke, the dosiers of the 
mingling between aesthetic and scientiic research, and those of the rela-
tionship between knowledge of reality and its visual representation within 
the sphere of research on Leonardo, two themes that have since occupied 
an ever-expanding space in the discusion concerning Leonardo and some 
of his contemporaries17.
12 Cf. G. Federici Vescovini, Studi sula prospetiva medioevale, Torino 1965, pp. 40, 45; 
D.C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler, Chicago/London 1976, p. 19 
(where both Thorndike, and Federici Vescovini are quoted).
13 R. Nanni, «Astrologia e prospetiva: per lo studio del’immagine dela scienza nel 
Paragone dele arti di Leonardo», in: Raccolta Vinciana, xxvi, 1997, pp. 13-81: 72.
14 C. Luporini, La mente di Leonardo, Firenze 1953, pp. 168-169. Cf., now, regarding 
analogy, A. Nova, «Valore e limiti del metodo analogico nel’opera di Leonardo da Vinci», 
paper presented at the symposium Leonardo da Vinci: metodi e tecniche per la costruzione 
dela conoscenza. Dal disegno, al’arte, ala scienza, organized by P.C. Marani, Milano, May 
13-14, 2015.
15 Cf. K.D. Keele, «Leonardo da Vinci’s Physiology of the Senses», in: Leonardo’s Legacy, 
ed. by C.D. O’Maley, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1969, pp. 35-56; id., Leonardo da Vinci’s Ele-
ments of the Science of Man, New York/London 1983; M. Kemp, Leonardo da Vinci: The 
Marvelous Works of Nature and Man, London/Melbourne/Toronto 1981. Cf. also K.H. 
Veltman, Studies on Leonardo da Vinci I. Linear Perspective and the Visual Dimension of 
Science and Art, München 1986.
16 E.H. Gombrich, «The Form of Movement in Water and Air», in: Leonardo’s Legacy, 
1969 (as in n. 15), pp. 171-204.
17 Cf., to obtain a irst impresion in relation to Leonardo, the studies colected in 
Leonardo da Vinci and Optics. Theory and Pictorial Practice, ed. by F. Fiorani & A. Nova, 
Venezia 2013. More generaly cf. M. Krieger, «The Ambiguities of Representation and 
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In particular, two important and markedly different books – published 
in the same year – by Frank Fehrenbach and Daniel Arasse18, are hardly 
conceivable without the distant stimuli born from that essay by Gom-
brich, stimuli – whether shared or not – which prompted scholars to work 
on Leonardo with a new awareness. In fact, neither the connection be-
tween art and science (whether or not mediated by analogy), nor that be-
tween knowledge and representation is immediate or obvious. This forces 
us to explore a whole range of issues – from the Renaissance system of 
the arts to the visual appropriation of reality, from the link between vi-
sion and perspective projection to that between ‘paradigms’ (in the sense 
of Thomas Kuhn) and perceptual experience, etc. – for which Leonardo 
has, over the years, become a unique testing ground, one might even say 
an almost perfect ‘case study’. Finally freed from the issue of the lack of 
impact of Leonardo’s inventions and research on the history of technology 
and science (but studies on the circulation of the Treatise on Painting and 
the Leicester Codex, to take two examples, have started to place this mat-
ter on a new basis as well)19, the discussion regarding Leonardo on Nature 
today develops in very different directions, but all – we believe – united 
by this renewed critical awareness of the dual relationship between art and 
science, representation and knowledge20.
4. The fact that in recent decades a series of parallel systematic research 
has begun concerning Leonardo’s language is not without significance. In 
this regard, Carlo Pedretti noted in 1995:
As Kenneth Clark wrote exactly thirty years ago: ‘It is not an exaggeration to 
say that the Treatise on Painting by Leonardo da Vinci is the most precious docu-
ment in the history of art’. We can today add that art historians are no longer 
sufficient: it takes language historians in order to prove this21.
Before Pedretti, contributions concerning Leonardo’s language were 
scarce. In 1982 Maria Luisa Altieri Biagi recorded the «poverty of literature 
in the field of the history of the language» regarding Leonardo and conse-
quently noted: «the problem of the study of Leonardo’s own language is 
rather distressing»22. Altieri Biagi framed this poverty within the more gen-
eral «lack of research tools (starting with the documentation provided by 
our historical vocabularies, notoriously inadequate concerning the ‘langue’ 
of technique and science)»23, and as one of the very few exceptions she 
cited the study by Paola Manni, La terminologia della meccanica applicata 
nel Cinquecento e ai primi del Seicento dated 198024. 
Among the many merits of the much missed Romano Nanni, we can 
certainly recall that of having promoted a series of important studies in 
this area. With the support of Paola Manni, of Marco Biffi and of other 
scholars, this isolation (to quote Altieri Biagi again: «there is no work so 
singular that it cannot be placed within a literary and linguistic conven-
tion»25) which Leonardo had experienced for so long in terms of the his-
tory of language, finally ended; an isolation that was born in part from the 
above-mentioned lack of interest in technical vocabularies among Italian 
linguists, and in part from the preconceived notion concerning Leonardo’s 
‘splendid isolation’. The e-Leo project (Archivio digitale di storia della tec-
nica e della scienza)26 is now flanked by a series of studies that begin to 
Illusion: An E.H. Gombrich Retrospective», in: Critical Inquiry, xi, 2, 1984, pp. 181-
194. And Gombrich’s reply: E.H. Gombrich, «Representation and Misrepresentation», in: 
Critical Inquiry, xi, 2, 1984, pp. 195-201.
18 F. Fehrenbach, Licht und Wasser. Zur Dynamik naturphilosophischer Leitbilder im Werk 
Leonardo da Vincis, Tübingen 1997; D. Arasse, Léonard de Vinci. Le rythme du monde, 
Paris 1997.
19 As regards the first point, we refer to the fundamental studies by R. Nanni: cf. «Luce 
e ritratto nel Trattato della pittura di Lionardo da Vinci», in: Leonardo da Vinci and Optics, 
2013 (as in n. 17), pp. 217-246; but also, more generally, «Il concetto di Rinascimento 
e Leonardo: Febvre, Garin, Panofsky», in: Leonardo «1952» e la cultura dell’Europa nel 
dopoguerra, proceedings of the International Conference (October 29-31, 2009), ed. by R. 
Nanni & M. Torrini, Firenze 2013, pp. 3-76. Concerning the second point, see now the 
essay by D. Laurenza contained in this volume: «Leonardo’s Theory of the Earth: Unex-
plored Issues in Geology from the Codex Leicester».
20 A significant example in this sense is the collection of essays Natur im Übergang, ed. 
by F. Fehrenbach, München 2002. 
21 Libro di pittura. Codice Urbinate lat. 1270 nella Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, ed. by 
C. Pedretti & C. Vecce, Firenze 1995, pp. 78-79.
22 M.L. Altieri Biagi, «Considerazioni sulla lingua di Leonardo», in Notiziario vinciano, 
vi, 2, 1982, pp. 11-29: 12.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Cf. http://www.leonardodigitale.com/.
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In particular, two important and markedly different books – published 
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in the field of the history of the language» regarding Leonardo and conse-
quently noted: «the problem of the study of Leonardo’s own language is 
rather distressing»22. Altieri Biagi framed this poverty within the more gen-
eral «lack of research tools (starting with the documentation provided by 
our historical vocabularies, notoriously inadequate concerning the ‘langue’ 
of technique and science)»23, and as one of the very few exceptions she 
cited the study by Paola Manni, La terminologia della meccanica applicata 
nel Cinquecento e ai primi del Seicento dated 198024. 
Among the many merits of the much missed Romano Nanni, we can 
certainly recall that of having promoted a series of important studies in 
this area. With the support of Paola Manni, of Marco Biffi and of other 
scholars, this isolation (to quote Altieri Biagi again: «there is no work so 
singular that it cannot be placed within a literary and linguistic conven-
tion»25) which Leonardo had experienced for so long in terms of the his-
tory of language, finally ended; an isolation that was born in part from the 
above-mentioned lack of interest in technical vocabularies among Italian 
linguists, and in part from the preconceived notion concerning Leonardo’s 
‘splendid isolation’. The e-Leo project (Archivio digitale di storia della tec-
nica e della scienza)26 is now flanked by a series of studies that begin to 
Illusion: An E.H. Gombrich Retrospective», in: Critical Inquiry, xi, 2, 1984, pp. 181-
194. And Gombrich’s reply: E.H. Gombrich, «Representation and Misrepresentation», in: 
Critical Inquiry, xi, 2, 1984, pp. 195-201.
18 F. Fehrenbach, Licht und Wasser. Zur Dynamik naturphilosophischer Leitbilder im Werk 
Leonardo da Vincis, Tübingen 1997; D. Arasse, Léonard de Vinci. Le rythme du monde, 
Paris 1997.
19 As regards the first point, we refer to the fundamental studies by R. Nanni: cf. «Luce 
e ritratto nel Trattato della pittura di Lionardo da Vinci», in: Leonardo da Vinci and Optics, 
2013 (as in n. 17), pp. 217-246; but also, more generally, «Il concetto di Rinascimento 
e Leonardo: Febvre, Garin, Panofsky», in: Leonardo «1952» e la cultura dell’Europa nel 
dopoguerra, proceedings of the International Conference (October 29-31, 2009), ed. by R. 
Nanni & M. Torrini, Firenze 2013, pp. 3-76. Concerning the second point, see now the 
essay by D. Laurenza contained in this volume: «Leonardo’s Theory of the Earth: Unex-
plored Issues in Geology from the Codex Leicester».
20 A significant example in this sense is the collection of essays Natur im Übergang, ed. 
by F. Fehrenbach, München 2002. 
21 Libro di pittura. Codice Urbinate lat. 1270 nella Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, ed. by 
C. Pedretti & C. Vecce, Firenze 1995, pp. 78-79.
22 M.L. Altieri Biagi, «Considerazioni sulla lingua di Leonardo», in Notiziario vinciano, 
vi, 2, 1982, pp. 11-29: 12.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Cf. http://www.leonardodigitale.com/.
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establish some lynchpins27. One of these is the standardisation, carried out 
by Leonardo, of a broad technical terminology alongside and in addition 
to the assimilation of the pre-existing technical terminology through the 
study of specialised lexica (the De Re Militari by Roberto Valturio trans-
lated into vernacular by Paolo Ramusio, the Vocabulista by Luigi Pulci, and 
the Novellino by Masuccio Salernitano28). Leonardo’s language is therefore 
full of first records: not because he invented new words (although he did 
that, too), but because, for the first time, he ‘regulated’ some ‘entries’ that 
had enjoyed «a previous vitality within those environments where for cen-
turies craftsmanship knowledge was essentially transmitted orally»29.
Whilst shifting from one field to another, Leonardo refines words, push-
ing them towards a more general or a more precise meaning; and at the 
same time the epistemic technical and craftsmanship matrix from which 
he starts is redefined by contact with the great models offered by tradition: 
the fourteenth century perspectiva, the physics of impetus, the scientia de 
ponderibus, etc. The result is both a language and a model of science that 
are at the same time highly sensitive and unstable30. A further result is an 
unusual discrepancy between Leonardo’s not only linguistic but also meth-
odological and metaphysical approach and the epistemological ideal that 
he always strove to achieve: while the order is always partial and surfaces 
from zones of disorder that cannot be deleted (and that, on the contrary, 
nurture this order from the inside) in the former, the latter instead reflects 
an idea of accuracy and completeness that, given the circumstances, it is 
impossible to draw on31. This is due, at least in part, to the unique blend 
of varying knowledge located in Leonardo’s ‘science’, which was born as a 
type of re-transfer into nature of Alberti’s perspective32, and it is thanks to 
this step that perspective regains its ‘cornerstone’ status in natural philoso-
phy without losing (at least in Leonardo’s intentions) the accuracy that he 
had achieved thanks to the transformation given by Alberti.
5. On the basis of these considerations, we can confirm the importance 
in Leonardo’s thought of the dual link art-science and representation-know-
ledge. The ambiguity of perspective, which he understood as the science 
of representation, which is connected to painting but simultaneously re-
turned to its status as natural philosophy and returned to the theory of 
vision, constantly keeps both levels in play: nature understood in its most 
profound reality, almost as a fact that affirms its power in relation to the 
observer, and art as interaction with this profound reality, but also emu-
lation, competition and, in some respects, its reduction on the basis of 
precise conventions, i.e. a ‘language’, which is verified by the effects it 
produces in the audience of the visual show staged in the painting.
27 Cf. P. Manni, «Riconsiderando la lingua di Leonardo. Nuove indagini e prospettive 
di studio», in: Studi linguistici italiani, xxxiv, 1, 2008, pp. 11-51; ead., Percorsi nella lingua 
di Leonardo: grafie, forme, parole, (xlviii Lettura Vinciana – 2007), Firenze 2008; M.R. 
D’Anzi, «Appunti sul lessico anatomico di Leonardo da Vinci», in: Leonardo da Vinci’s 
Anatomical World: Language, Context and «Disegno», ed. by A. Nova & D. Laurenza 2011, 
pp. 43-60; ead., «Il lessico anatomico di Leonardo da Vinci e la tradizione medica in volgare: 
continuità e discontinuità», in: Volgarizzare, tradurre, interpretare nei secc. xiii-xvi, ed. by 
S. Lubello, Strasbourg 2011, pp. 209-221; Glossario Leonardiano. Nomenclatura delle mac-
chine nei Codici di Madrid e Atlantico, ed. by P. Manni & M. Biffi, Firenze 2011; R. Nanni, 
Leonardo da Vinci e le «arti meccaniche», with contributions from M. Biffi, F. Giusberti, 
A. Neuwahl, D. Russo, Milano-Vinci 2013; M. Quaglino, Leonardo «trattatore della luce»: 
prime osservazioni sul lessico dell’ottica nei codici di Francia, in: Studi di lessicografia italiana, 
Vol. xxx, 2013, pp. 93-132; Glossario leonardiano. Nomenclatura dell’ottica e della prospettiva 
nei codici di Francia, ed. by M. Quaglino, Firenze 2013; M. Biffi, «Alcune prime osservazi-
oni sulla lingua artistica di Leonardo», in: Studi di Memofonte, 10, 2013, pp. 183-205.
28 Cfr. A. Marinoni, «Saggio sugli appunti grammaticali e lessicali di Leonardo da Vin-
ci», in: Leonardo da Vinci, Scritti letterari, ed. by A. Marinoni, new enlarged edition, 
Milano 1974 (1952), pp. 227-238; C. Vecce, Leonardo, Roma 1998, pp. 99-101.
29 P. Manni, «Introduzione», in: Glossario Leonardiano. Nomenclatura delle macchine nei 
Codici di Madrid e Atlantico, 2011 (as in n. 27), p. xxi.
30 Regarding the composite character of Leonardo’s language, with «particularly daring 
forms of coexistence between ‘high’ and ‘low’, courtly and popular», cf. Manni, 2008 (as 
in n. 27), pp. 49-51. Regarding the tension between orality and writing in the ‘words’ of 
Leonardo cf. C. Vecce, «Parola e immagine nei manoscritti di Leonardo», in: Percorsi tra 
parole e immagini, 1400-1600, ed. by A. Guidotti & M. Rossi, Lucca 2000, pp. 19-35.
31 Leonardo’s conception of nature is much more dramatic than Ficino’s concordia dis-
cors, with which, in any case, he maintains a clear link. Cf. S. Toussaint, «Leonardo filoso-
fo dei contrari», in: Leonardo e Pico. Analogie, contatti, confronti, ed. by F. Frosini, Firenze 
2005, pp. 13-35. But now compare Toussaint’s contribution in this volume («L’autore e la 
natura. Alberti, Leonardo e Michelangelo») with a strong critical view.
32 For this thesis cf. A.M. Brizio, «Razzi incidenti e razzi refressi», (iii Lettura Vinciana – 
1963), in: Leonardo da Vinci letto e commentato. Letture vinciane i-xii (1960-1972), ed. by P. 
Galluzzi, Firenze 1974, pp. 63-77; F. Frosini, «Leonardo da Alberti a Bacone (e oltre)», in: 
«Tutte le opere non son per istancarmi». Raccolta di scritti per i settant’anni di Carlo Pedretti, 
ed. by F. Frosini, Roma 1998, pp. 145-158.
18 19
leonardo da vinci on nature: knowledge and representationfabio frosini, alessandro nova
establish some lynchpins27. One of these is the standardisation, carried out 
by Leonardo, of a broad technical terminology alongside and in addition 
to the assimilation of the pre-existing technical terminology through the 
study of specialised lexica (the De Re Militari by Roberto Valturio trans-
lated into vernacular by Paolo Ramusio, the Vocabulista by Luigi Pulci, and 
the Novellino by Masuccio Salernitano28). Leonardo’s language is therefore 
full of first records: not because he invented new words (although he did 
that, too), but because, for the first time, he ‘regulated’ some ‘entries’ that 
had enjoyed «a previous vitality within those environments where for cen-
turies craftsmanship knowledge was essentially transmitted orally»29.
Whilst shifting from one field to another, Leonardo refines words, push-
ing them towards a more general or a more precise meaning; and at the 
same time the epistemic technical and craftsmanship matrix from which 
he starts is redefined by contact with the great models offered by tradition: 
the fourteenth century perspectiva, the physics of impetus, the scientia de 
ponderibus, etc. The result is both a language and a model of science that 
are at the same time highly sensitive and unstable30. A further result is an 
unusual discrepancy between Leonardo’s not only linguistic but also meth-
odological and metaphysical approach and the epistemological ideal that 
he always strove to achieve: while the order is always partial and surfaces 
from zones of disorder that cannot be deleted (and that, on the contrary, 
nurture this order from the inside) in the former, the latter instead reflects 
an idea of accuracy and completeness that, given the circumstances, it is 
impossible to draw on31. This is due, at least in part, to the unique blend 
of varying knowledge located in Leonardo’s ‘science’, which was born as a 
type of re-transfer into nature of Alberti’s perspective32, and it is thanks to 
this step that perspective regains its ‘cornerstone’ status in natural philoso-
phy without losing (at least in Leonardo’s intentions) the accuracy that he 
had achieved thanks to the transformation given by Alberti.
5. On the basis of these considerations, we can confirm the importance 
in Leonardo’s thought of the dual link art-science and representation-know-
ledge. The ambiguity of perspective, which he understood as the science 
of representation, which is connected to painting but simultaneously re-
turned to its status as natural philosophy and returned to the theory of 
vision, constantly keeps both levels in play: nature understood in its most 
profound reality, almost as a fact that affirms its power in relation to the 
observer, and art as interaction with this profound reality, but also emu-
lation, competition and, in some respects, its reduction on the basis of 
precise conventions, i.e. a ‘language’, which is verified by the effects it 
produces in the audience of the visual show staged in the painting.
27 Cf. P. Manni, «Riconsiderando la lingua di Leonardo. Nuove indagini e prospettive 
di studio», in: Studi linguistici italiani, xxxiv, 1, 2008, pp. 11-51; ead., Percorsi nella lingua 
di Leonardo: grafie, forme, parole, (xlviii Lettura Vinciana – 2007), Firenze 2008; M.R. 
D’Anzi, «Appunti sul lessico anatomico di Leonardo da Vinci», in: Leonardo da Vinci’s 
Anatomical World: Language, Context and «Disegno», ed. by A. Nova & D. Laurenza 2011, 
pp. 43-60; ead., «Il lessico anatomico di Leonardo da Vinci e la tradizione medica in volgare: 
continuità e discontinuità», in: Volgarizzare, tradurre, interpretare nei secc. xiii-xvi, ed. by 
S. Lubello, Strasbourg 2011, pp. 209-221; Glossario Leonardiano. Nomenclatura delle mac-
chine nei Codici di Madrid e Atlantico, ed. by P. Manni & M. Biffi, Firenze 2011; R. Nanni, 
Leonardo da Vinci e le «arti meccaniche», with contributions from M. Biffi, F. Giusberti, 
A. Neuwahl, D. Russo, Milano-Vinci 2013; M. Quaglino, Leonardo «trattatore della luce»: 
prime osservazioni sul lessico dell’ottica nei codici di Francia, in: Studi di lessicografia italiana, 
Vol. xxx, 2013, pp. 93-132; Glossario leonardiano. Nomenclatura dell’ottica e della prospettiva 
nei codici di Francia, ed. by M. Quaglino, Firenze 2013; M. Biffi, «Alcune prime osservazi-
oni sulla lingua artistica di Leonardo», in: Studi di Memofonte, 10, 2013, pp. 183-205.
28 Cfr. A. Marinoni, «Saggio sugli appunti grammaticali e lessicali di Leonardo da Vin-
ci», in: Leonardo da Vinci, Scritti letterari, ed. by A. Marinoni, new enlarged edition, 
Milano 1974 (1952), pp. 227-238; C. Vecce, Leonardo, Roma 1998, pp. 99-101.
29 P. Manni, «Introduzione», in: Glossario Leonardiano. Nomenclatura delle macchine nei 
Codici di Madrid e Atlantico, 2011 (as in n. 27), p. xxi.
30 Regarding the composite character of Leonardo’s language, with «particularly daring 
forms of coexistence between ‘high’ and ‘low’, courtly and popular», cf. Manni, 2008 (as 
in n. 27), pp. 49-51. Regarding the tension between orality and writing in the ‘words’ of 
Leonardo cf. C. Vecce, «Parola e immagine nei manoscritti di Leonardo», in: Percorsi tra 
parole e immagini, 1400-1600, ed. by A. Guidotti & M. Rossi, Lucca 2000, pp. 19-35.
31 Leonardo’s conception of nature is much more dramatic than Ficino’s concordia dis-
cors, with which, in any case, he maintains a clear link. Cf. S. Toussaint, «Leonardo filoso-
fo dei contrari», in: Leonardo e Pico. Analogie, contatti, confronti, ed. by F. Frosini, Firenze 
2005, pp. 13-35. But now compare Toussaint’s contribution in this volume («L’autore e la 
natura. Alberti, Leonardo e Michelangelo») with a strong critical view.
32 For this thesis cf. A.M. Brizio, «Razzi incidenti e razzi refressi», (iii Lettura Vinciana – 
1963), in: Leonardo da Vinci letto e commentato. Letture vinciane i-xii (1960-1972), ed. by P. 
Galluzzi, Firenze 1974, pp. 63-77; F. Frosini, «Leonardo da Alberti a Bacone (e oltre)», in: 
«Tutte le opere non son per istancarmi». Raccolta di scritti per i settant’anni di Carlo Pedretti, 
ed. by F. Frosini, Roma 1998, pp. 145-158.
20 21
leonardo da vinci on nature: knowledge and representationfabio frosini, alessandro nova
These two axes can perhaps be taken as the coordinates framing the 
relative positions taken by the authors of the contributions hosted in this 
volume. These are divided into four sections, focusing, respectively, on 
the confrontation between humanity and nature; on the theoretical and 
philosophical issues arising from the attempt to ‘think’ nature; on the in-
terweaving of philosophical, scientific, technical and artistic themes that 
occurs in the comparison between painting as a language and painting as 
the direct expression of natural dynamics; and finally on the relationship 
between the theoretical and the artistic dimensions, which stems from the 
task of reproducing and studying natural reality. Of course, the order we 
propose is partly arbitrary, given that, in reality, all these issues circulate 
in varying degrees in the majority of the texts collected here. There are, 
however, differences of emphasis and approach between the various texts, 
which we believe substantiate this subdivision.
In the two texts collected in the first section (Man and Nature), a critical 
eye is turned to Leonardo’s writings on the basis of a double demarcation 
line: his relationship with the preceding culture and the way in which 
through this relationship, the confrontation of man (who is also the ‘au-
thor’ of a text) with nature is established, a confrontation that is always 
simultaneously emulation, challenge, and imitation. The texts by Leonid 
M. Batkin and Stéphane Toussaint diverge widely in both their results 
and their approach, but one aspect which undoubtedly unites them is the 
identification of Leon Battista Alberti as an exceptional reference point. As 
is well known, direct references to Alberti are scarce in Leonardo. Batkin, 
however, demonstrates that in reality, all the theory and poetics of Leonar-
do’s painting are thought of as a heated debate with Alberti.
Batkin (Leon Battista Alberti e Leonardo da Vinci sul gesto in pittura) 
deals with the study of «gestures in painting» within his culturological 
approach to the Renaissance world, particularly regarding issues of in-
dividuality and personality. Batkin argues that the way the ‘gesture’ is 
encoded in its pictorial expression is not the feature of a unique and im-
measurable personality, in the full modern sense of the term. It «leads, on 
the contrary, to the Whole. The gesture as an ‘element of everyday life’ is 
mediated by ‘nature’ as it is by the worldly and universal, everyday life. 
The ‘alphabet’ is not psychological, but has a naturalistic value». Nature 
is expressed by the gestures of the characters, but not immediately: when 
studying a «repertoire of gestures [...] the painter not only looks every 
time, but also thinks of a possible twist, of a combination of movements, 
of their amplitude etc. for a given representation, depicting them as the 
plastic expression of a universal individual». It is in the ‘folds’ of this 
combinatory method, aimed at delineating universal man, that Batkin 
believes the origin of the passage towards modern individuality is hidden, 
and which is therefore, first and foremost, the individuality of an author. 
«Leon Battista Alberti already knew the unprecedented innovative value 
of his treatises and his instructions, and therefore also the value of himself 
as their author. Leonardo feels his superiority in everything even more 
acutely and openly he is exalted by the passion of observation, the pride of 
mastering the most hidden secrets of the art and the invaluable combina-
tion of ‘universality’ and ‘uniqueness’».
This, which is Batkin’s arrival point, is the starting point of the critical 
review conducted by Toussaint (L’autore e la natura. Alberti, Leonardo e 
Michelangelo). In this regard, however, he first states the need to distance 
oneself from Leonardo’s self-representation: «After all, critique, even the 
fiercest, ended up putting back into circulation Leonardo’s self-promotion, 
with very few amendments – omo sanza lettere smarter than the humanists 
– without being weighed down by the sources and implications, including 
sociological, of his cultural inferiority complex». In particular, Toussaint 
focuses on Leonardo’s ambiguous relationship with Alberti: «The influ-
ence this model had on Leonardo was very strong, and the sincerity of 
the omo sanza lettere, an enemy of humanists, therefore, allows suspecting 
some duplicity». If, on the other hand, we move on to consider testimonies 
about Leonardo, beginning with Vasari, we realise how hard, if not imprac-
tical, the prospect of becoming an ‘author’ was for Leonardo. The «obses-
sive pictorial imitation of the ‘natural’» and «the proximity to the animal 
world» indicate the presence in Leonardo of «a deep impulse: the total 
identification with nature, mistress of thought and life. Between the divine 
predestination and the worship of nature, there is no room, in Leonardo’s 
Life, for the erudite culture which forged humanism». This total identifica-
tion was born in Leonardo – according to Toussaint – precisely from the 
consciousness of the defeat which will hit him as he is unable to master the 
language: that language which in the fifteenth century is the fundamental 
dimension (as the study of humanitas) in order to access culture and which 
«at the time had to be the Latin language». The solution devised by Leo-
nardo – his radical naturalism and empiricism – is merely the other face of 
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this defeat: «for his insoluble epistemological drama, Leonardo promises 
gnosiology and provides nothing more than genealogy».
6. The second section (Thinking Nature) collects contributions that may 
be conventionally defined as «philosophical». In a less generic way, should 
this term not have a very different meaning traditionally, we could say 
that here the focus consists in Leonardo’s ‘ontology’, i.e. the way in which 
the concept of ‘nature’ is configured in his thinking in relation with the 
‘deep’ layer, which constitutes reality in general. Once again, there are no 
unequivocal results, although a common thread may be found in the am-
bivalent and conflicted idea of nature and therefore of reality. This issue is 
explained in a particularly clear way by Romano Nanni (Catastrofi e armo-
nie), whose conclusion (Leonardo, although placed «in the middle of the 
Renaissance», is «as much an a-humanist, as he is an a-Christian») can use-
fully be placed in comparison with that of Toussaint given above. Nanni 
reconstructs Leonardo’s thought by organising it around the catastrophe/
harmony duo and following it through three successive ‘stations’ dated, 
respectively, to the 1480s , the period from the 1490s to the first decade of the 
sixteenth century, and the years 1513-1515. Nanni demonstrates how Leon-
ardo’s image of nature constantly oscillates between these two dimensions, 
which in any case complement each other perfectly, and how his attitude 
changes in relation to the conceptual instruments he possesses at each mo-
ment in order to rationally ‘master’ this ambivalence. This is the context 
within which he interprets Leonardo’s mathematical processing of the spi-
ral, which at one point becomes the image of the destructive violence of 
water (the storm water «eddies», «retrosi», depicted in his series of draw-
ings of the Deluge) and together, inextricably, the result of a mathematical 
knowledge, that is – in a contradictory manner – a form of rationalisation 
of the catastrophe: «On one hand the representation of disasters, by virtue 
of the mediation of the retroso aesthetics, the spiral aesthetics, is governed 
by an ordered framework, whose foundations are regulated by constant 
mathematical proportions, establishing an emotional distance between a 
possible direct experience of dreadful nature, and its visual contemplation, 
which can be appreciated as harmony and almost as grace. On the other 
hand, here harmony is all on nature’s side, and on the side of the scientific 
and artistic representation by the subject». What Nanni called «the science 
of retrosi» thus becomes an actual conciliation between the destructive im-
pulse, the natural law and even an idea of beauty, in the sense that there 
is no chaos in its purest state within the «flood» itself, but nonetheless a 
constant unfolding of a series of measurable laws perceived as visual har-
monies.
Whilst the alternative with which Nanni works is the one between the 
composition of an ‘order’ and its catastrophic dissolution, the contribu-
tion by Fabio Frosini («Mistioni» e «termini», ovvero dell’«accidentale» in 
natura) stands instead on the line of distinction between these two mo-
ments, on the assumption that the entire movement of Leonardo’s thought 
leads towards neutralising this alternative, i.e., towards developing a con-
cept of nature and life subjected to permanent character changes, not just 
cyclical, but open and constructive. The key words used by Frosini in this 
study are «termini» (limits) and «mistioni» (mixtures). He shows how they 
move from an initial incompatibility to a structurally entwined position. 
In particular, after the notes concerning the «being of nothing» («essere del 
nulla»), the «limits» become a threshold devoid of reality, «an oscillating 
field, in which the logics mingle inextricably». Therefore, the dichotomy 
between nature and accident also tends towards evanescence: «civilisation 
is an occasional interruption of nature, but it is nature which takes on the 
aspect of ‘historicity’ which places it in a continuing relationship with the 
sphere of civilization». Towards the end of the first decade of the sixteenth 
century a number of texts show – according to Frosini – «the assimilation 
[...] of the concept of ‘accidental’ with that of ‘mixture’», so that from this 
height the distinction between simple bodies (determined naturally) and 
accidental compounds «is not [...] ontological but morphological: i.e. it 
passes through forms of different levels and origin – natural and artificial, 
ancient and recent, relatively stable and relatively ever-changing – which, 
however, all belong to the same level of reality: that of more or less mobile 
and changing ‘compounds’». These findings have an ethical-political as-
pect because it is precisely within the ‘mixtures’ that the ‘divinity’ of man 
(the great humanist topos) is proven: civilisation ‘expresses’ nature through 
language, machines and institutions.
The Lucretian background of this idea is suggested by Frosini at the end 
of his essay. This issue, however, receives monographic attention in Alison 
Brown’s contribution («Natura idest?» Leonardo, Lucretius, and Their Views 
of Nature). Brown reconstructs this issue with all its implications, starting 
with the presence of Lucretian themes in Florence, both through the fif-
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teenth century and at the beginning of the following century. Whilst being 
aware of the risk of exaggerating – as there is only one explicit reference to 
Lucretius’s great ancient poem by Leonardo, and even this is known only 
through a second-hand source –. Brown believes we can speak of undeni-
able Lucretian «echoes», particularly in the ambivalent concept of nature, 
the description of the storms and the fury of the elements, the idea of a 
language organically linked to natural processes (within the general ‘primi-
tivist’ background of the many visual and verbal descriptions made by 
Leonardo), and finally – and this is perhaps the most important point of 
the entire essay – the elaboration of the concept of the «being of nothing», 
in particular of the «punctus» as the equivalent of «nothing». «We know 
[...] that the mathematical concept of the punctus was associated with Lu-
cretius’s atom in Florence in the 1490s from the interesting marginalia in a 
Lucretius (Laurenziana pl. 35, 32) that have been ascribed to Machiavelli’s 
teacher Marcello Adriani and his pupils». In his notes on «the being of 
nothing», Leonardo switches from an Aristotelian view of the point as 
infinitely divisible to a notion of the ‘indivisible’ point, similar to the one 
now shown and therefore connected to the concept of the ‘atom’. «It is 
unnecessary», Brown concludes, «to insist on a Lucretian origin for Leo-
nardo’s changing views on the punctus, which in their later version seem 
to be linked to his study of optics. Nevertheless, they strikingly reflect the 
contrast drawn by the marginalia between the punctus as a mathematical 
or imaginary point that is infinitely divisible (Leonardo’s starting point) 
and the atomist view of it as a unity that cannot be divided, a contrast that 
Leonardo worked through before reaching his equally Lucretian conclu-
sion that the huge number of atoms (‘indivisible parts’) in the sun’s rays 
was a source of vivifying energy. So Lucretius may help to explain some of 
the ambiguities of Leonardo’s late thinking».
7. The third section (Science, Art and Languages in, beyond and against 
Nature) is devoted to illustrating the relationship between painting and 
nature. Running through this relationship – as is apparent from all the con-
tributions collected here – is an internal tension between the great classical 
model of imitation and a controversial scheme in which art and nature op-
pose one another in a dramatic challenge. Nevertheless, there is a continuity 
between these different options given by the profound correspondence 
between nature as a generator of energy, strength, and even violence, and 
the images, which according to Leonardo should aim to incorporate the 
same power and violence present in natural images even when they are 
reproduced artificially. Carlo Vecce focuses on this complex interplay of 
referrals (Leonardo e il ‘paragone’ della natura), stating that a double com-
parison is in fact present in this ‘comparison’ of the arts: of painting, which 
goes beyond nature, but also of the painter who competes with it. The 
painter thus lies ambiguously inside and outside nature, celebrating time 
as an expression of nature but also aiming to capture it in the painted 
image. These paradoxes are all reflected in the double image of nature as 
‘mother’ and ‘stepmother’, harmonic and terrible, and in the notion of 
time as creator but also destroyer. Leonardo never wrote of the ‘compari-
son’ between painting (and the painter) and nature; if he had, he would 
have noted that, «if nature has to obey the laws of necessity, the painter 
goes beyond those laws, triumphing over necessity and time (or at least 
creating a momentary illusion of triumph). His record mainly consists in 
preserving the (artificial) simulacrum of beauty, whose (natural) archetype 
is destroyed by time or by death». The painter is therefore able to stop «the 
universal story of abuse of one organism over another, in an endless cycle 
of transformation and metamorphosis which involves all forms of nature», 
but this interruption stands within the grounds of that ‘illusion’ which 
constitutes the meaning of civilisation.
This gap between nature and civilisation, between a reality that imposes 
itself through its own strength and a set of meanings subject to dispersion 
and a multiplicity of interpretations, is the starting point of the essay by 
Frank Fehrenbach (The Cycle of Images). He notes that unlike words, im-
ages are not subject to a ‘code’: images, in fact, are immediately ‘imprinted’ 
in the first faculty of perception (‘imprensiva’, a new faculty introduced by 
Leonardo). Hence the idea that images have a ‘cyclical’ aspect, since they 
move from nature to knowledge and vice versa, thanks to images produced 
artificially. Where artificial images reach a high degree of illusion, they can 
therefore enhance and strengthen nature: «the simulacra produced by the 
painter are nature’s transient emanations made durable, and enhanced in 
beauty and expressive qualities». According to Fehrenbach, this is where 
the function of painting within the space that unites but also divides and 
opposes nature to civilisation, derives from: «Painting, triggered by the 
power of nature to impress or imprint its own images in the mind of man, 
emerges as a ‘second nature’, an expression of the first nature’s longing to 
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maintain the existence of every product, suspending the fugacity of time. 
While the first nature struggles to overcome death through procreation, 
pittura (painting) ‘doesn’t have children’ (‘non partorisce figliuoli eguali a 
sé’); she is the promise of a life in time without death».
The idea of a natural force or power that is repeated, grows and is trans-
formed (in a certain sense inverting itself ) into the painter’s work, as al-
ready assumed in Fehrenbach’s essay, lies at the centre of the contribu-
tion by Francesca Borgo (The Impetus of Battle: Visualizing Antagonism in 
Leonardo). The underlying issue here is the relationship between terminology 
and the problems of the impetus (i.e. of the mechanics) and terminology 
and the problems of painting. To this end, Borgo formulates an expanded 
conception of impetus that goes far beyond the technical meaning of vis 
impressa, embracing the phenomenon of the afterimage as the ability of the 
work of art to ‘attack’ the viewer, thereby transmitting a kind of vis im-
pressa. Borgo identifies a precise path within this crossroad that leads from 
motion in the mechanical sense to the typical ‘animation’ of painting. «Im-
petus, therefore, performs painting’s most crucial task, that of apparent 
enlivenment and animation; painted images are expressive of living things 
without having life in themselves». Impetus in painting would therefore be 
that ‘accidental liveliness’ which is added to the images, and which would 
give them that momentary vividness that mechanical impetus transmits to 
dead things by putting them in motion. However, «being accidental and 
not natural, this fictive vivacity can only be achieved by means of violence, 
intended, in accordance with the Aristotelian tradition, as the application 
of a force that causes an object to move in an imposed way that counter-
acts its natural inclination. It follows that in enforced, violent movements 
– when the impetus is at its greatest – the painter finds an opportunity 
to convey great animation: for example in battle scenes, where motion 
is particularly dynamic». The greatest example of this pictorial challenge 
is the struggle for the banner in the Battle of Anghiari, in which different 
forces support and ‘block’ each other. In this way, the painter gains the ef-
fect of interrupting the self-destructive fugacity of the force: «The image 
embodies impetus’s fundamental quality, creating a juncture where both 
stability and instability, the conservation of motion and its undoing, para-
doxically coincide». Thanks to the mediation of the narrative embedded 
in the figurative language of the pictorial composition, the impetus of the 
artist’s mind is added to that present in the bodies in action. «In a scene of 
uttermost destruction, the representation of violent motion testifies to the 
animating power of painting. Fighting figures are enlivened by the most 
extreme ‘vivacità accidentale’; only on the verge of death do bodies come 
fully to life».
The scene of the struggle for the banner in the Battle of Anghiari is also 
the focus of the essay by Michael Cole (Leonardo contro Natura), which 
reinterprets a series of notes by Leonardo concerning centres of gravity and 
crossbows as the explanation of the basic theories of the situation depicted 
in the scene. According to Cole, it is «precisely in the project for the Bat-
tle of Anghiari that we see Leonardo develop the theories conceived while 
studying mechanical motion in a figurative direction, towards a reflection 
in images». The peculiarity of these reflections lies in the fact that, as em-
phasised also by Borgo, here the violent motion «is no longer equivalent 
to the discharge of a force» but, on the contrary (as in the case of loading a 
crossbow) «the compression of a form which therefore allows giving power 
to its own action». Cole notes that Leonardo pushes violence towards a 
form of paronomasia, as this term shifts through quite distinct fields, such 
as mechanics or depicting human bodies. The latter thereby become a 
prime example of visualising «deviations from the natural order».
8. The fourth and last section (The Form of Movement in Water and Earth) 
is devoted to illustrating themes of geology and cosmology in their rela-
tionship with the problem of scientific and artistic representation. Domen-
ico Laurenza (Leonardo’s Theory of the Earth: Unexplored Issues in Geology 
from the Codex Leicester) presents some preliminary conclusions that he 
reached during a new overview of the Codex Leicester, which he is carry-
ing out together with Martin Kemp and which will lead to a new critical 
edition. Laurenza’s main argument is that the Codex Leicester represents an 
early beginning of the modern ‘theories of the earth’ that would arise only 
in the late seventeenth century. Laurenza was driven to this conclusion by 
the fact that, in contrast to the Aristotelian approach, which postulates 
the presence on earth of only local changes and therefore the eternity of 
the planet, «the Codex Leicester contains striking and laborious demon-
strations of how the earth possessed a history comprising both local and 
global changes that occurred over extended time spans». Moreover, «on a 
global scale, according to Leonardo, dry land in the northern hemisphere 
had not existed forever, but emerged from the waters because of a cata-
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strophic event in a very remote era and then continued to change in a less 
catastrophic way. In both cases, marine fossils embedded in mountains, 
correctly interpreted by him as the remains of animals, provided evidence 
of these changes». Laurenza postulates that the theories presented in the 
Codex Leicester contain an echo of stories originating from exploration 
trips to the West Indies, which had shown the presence of a much larger 
quantity of land area than acknowledged since ancient times. «Leonardo 
was acquainted with members of the Vespucci family, not least Agostino, 
Amerigo’s cousin, who was an administrator involved in Leonardo’s work 
in the Florentine Council Hall. Leonardo’s figure of the earth with nearly 
all its circumference occupied by dry land on folio 36r may well be one of 
the first geological representations of the globe to accommodate what was 
then known about the New World».
Leslie A. Geddes also pays special attention to the relationship between 
water and land («Infinite Slowness and Infinite Velocity»: The Representa-
tion of Time and Motion in Leonardo’s Studies of Geology and Water), and 
like Laurenza, she locates an ‘historical’ conception of the earth in Leo-
nardo. But while Laurenza focuses on the relationship between the two 
elements – earth and water – on the geological scale, Geddes focuses on 
their punctual interaction: this is how a water flow in the long run forms 
rocks, which are subject to a continuous transformation. This transforma-
tion, however, originates in the contact between two seemingly opposing 
elements: «Leonardo’s studies of rock formations record his observations 
and interpret water’s incremental contouring of the land. In contrast, wa-
ter flow is fleeting and ephemeral». Leonardo is thus compelled to deal 
with speed at the two opposite edges of the infinite: the infinite slowness 
of rock transformation and the infinite speed of water producing shapes 
and forms, in both cases going beyond the scope of what it is possible to 
perceive. This poses problems for him, both as concerns the awareness of 
the phenomena and as concerns their representativeness – problems that 
are expressed both in verbal terms and in terms of the pictorial expression 
of nature. Therefore, when studying rocks belonging to his graphic work, 
Leonardo tries to fix in an image a kind of ‘arrested motion’, and when 
studying the flow of water, as it is impossible to see what is represented (be-
cause it is too fast), he visualises and stops an ‘instant’ of the motion. This 
cognitive supremacy of the image is reversed, however, in other cases, such 
as in the Codex Leicester, where a study concerning the materiality of the 
page and the probable sequence of its compilation reveals that, where an 
image is the primary and spontaneous form used by Leonardo to approach 
a particular problem, this is also marginal, as, once it is established as the 
first point of inquiry, it is then overcome by written reasoning.
The idea of a dynamic and historical nature is also at the heart of the 
essay by Alessandro Nova («Addj 5 daghossto 1473»: l’oggetto e le sue in-
terpretazioni), who consciously moves along the ridge running between 
the famous 8P sheet of the Gabinetto Disegni e Stampe of the Uffizi and 
the complex and layered history of its interpretation. By going along this 
ridge, Nova tries to gradually restore the sheet of paper to the context of 
its birth and to the role it initially held, thus making visible a level of sig-
nificance of the ‘landscape’ depicted in it, which a formalistic approach in-
stead tends to delete. Regarding the relationship between the reality of the 
depicted landscape and its representation, Nova supports the conclusions 
of those who believe that it is the result of a complex operation in which 
elements of observation, conventions and reconstruction are present33: 
«Every work of art, and therefore also a landscape portrayed ‘from life’, 
always constitutes a rhetorical fiction, an abstraction, especially in this case 
where the author has relied on a ‘plurality of representational scales’ and 
vanishing points. The artist could have changed and perhaps did change 
his position as he sketched, but in any case he uses a decentred perspective 
grid to build his image, as can be seen even more clearly if we remove the 
memorial lettering added by Leonardo after completing the work». Using 
various techniques was pertinent to the purposes pursued by Leonardo, as 
it is also true that, once «one has established that every work of art appeals 
to a specific visual rhetoric, it is nevertheless true that we could be faced by 
varying degrees of negotiation concerning the perception of the real world 
or of nature, as Leonardo would have said». Therefore, if 8P is not an iso-
lated and abstract attempt to depict a landscape, but a sheet of paper that 
is born (like many others) in the world of Verrocchio’s workshop, whether 
real or invented, it should be measured against the interests and roles that 
Leonardo assigns to that drawing. From this point of view, relying on a 
judgment by Cesare Luporini concerning the fall «of the border, in Leo-
33 The reference is to an important essay by R. Nanni, «Osservazione, convenzione, 
ricomposizione nel paesaggio leonardiano del 1473», in: Raccolta Vinciana, xxviii, 1999, 
pp. 3-37.
28 29
leonardo da vinci on nature: knowledge and representationfabio frosini, alessandro nova
strophic event in a very remote era and then continued to change in a less 
catastrophic way. In both cases, marine fossils embedded in mountains, 
correctly interpreted by him as the remains of animals, provided evidence 
of these changes». Laurenza postulates that the theories presented in the 
Codex Leicester contain an echo of stories originating from exploration 
trips to the West Indies, which had shown the presence of a much larger 
quantity of land area than acknowledged since ancient times. «Leonardo 
was acquainted with members of the Vespucci family, not least Agostino, 
Amerigo’s cousin, who was an administrator involved in Leonardo’s work 
in the Florentine Council Hall. Leonardo’s figure of the earth with nearly 
all its circumference occupied by dry land on folio 36r may well be one of 
the first geological representations of the globe to accommodate what was 
then known about the New World».
Leslie A. Geddes also pays special attention to the relationship between 
water and land («Infinite Slowness and Infinite Velocity»: The Representa-
tion of Time and Motion in Leonardo’s Studies of Geology and Water), and 
like Laurenza, she locates an ‘historical’ conception of the earth in Leo-
nardo. But while Laurenza focuses on the relationship between the two 
elements – earth and water – on the geological scale, Geddes focuses on 
their punctual interaction: this is how a water flow in the long run forms 
rocks, which are subject to a continuous transformation. This transforma-
tion, however, originates in the contact between two seemingly opposing 
elements: «Leonardo’s studies of rock formations record his observations 
and interpret water’s incremental contouring of the land. In contrast, wa-
ter flow is fleeting and ephemeral». Leonardo is thus compelled to deal 
with speed at the two opposite edges of the infinite: the infinite slowness 
of rock transformation and the infinite speed of water producing shapes 
and forms, in both cases going beyond the scope of what it is possible to 
perceive. This poses problems for him, both as concerns the awareness of 
the phenomena and as concerns their representativeness – problems that 
are expressed both in verbal terms and in terms of the pictorial expression 
of nature. Therefore, when studying rocks belonging to his graphic work, 
Leonardo tries to fix in an image a kind of ‘arrested motion’, and when 
studying the flow of water, as it is impossible to see what is represented (be-
cause it is too fast), he visualises and stops an ‘instant’ of the motion. This 
cognitive supremacy of the image is reversed, however, in other cases, such 
as in the Codex Leicester, where a study concerning the materiality of the 
page and the probable sequence of its compilation reveals that, where an 
image is the primary and spontaneous form used by Leonardo to approach 
a particular problem, this is also marginal, as, once it is established as the 
first point of inquiry, it is then overcome by written reasoning.
The idea of a dynamic and historical nature is also at the heart of the 
essay by Alessandro Nova («Addj 5 daghossto 1473»: l’oggetto e le sue in-
terpretazioni), who consciously moves along the ridge running between 
the famous 8P sheet of the Gabinetto Disegni e Stampe of the Uffizi and 
the complex and layered history of its interpretation. By going along this 
ridge, Nova tries to gradually restore the sheet of paper to the context of 
its birth and to the role it initially held, thus making visible a level of sig-
nificance of the ‘landscape’ depicted in it, which a formalistic approach in-
stead tends to delete. Regarding the relationship between the reality of the 
depicted landscape and its representation, Nova supports the conclusions 
of those who believe that it is the result of a complex operation in which 
elements of observation, conventions and reconstruction are present33: 
«Every work of art, and therefore also a landscape portrayed ‘from life’, 
always constitutes a rhetorical fiction, an abstraction, especially in this case 
where the author has relied on a ‘plurality of representational scales’ and 
vanishing points. The artist could have changed and perhaps did change 
his position as he sketched, but in any case he uses a decentred perspective 
grid to build his image, as can be seen even more clearly if we remove the 
memorial lettering added by Leonardo after completing the work». Using 
various techniques was pertinent to the purposes pursued by Leonardo, as 
it is also true that, once «one has established that every work of art appeals 
to a specific visual rhetoric, it is nevertheless true that we could be faced by 
varying degrees of negotiation concerning the perception of the real world 
or of nature, as Leonardo would have said». Therefore, if 8P is not an iso-
lated and abstract attempt to depict a landscape, but a sheet of paper that 
is born (like many others) in the world of Verrocchio’s workshop, whether 
real or invented, it should be measured against the interests and roles that 
Leonardo assigns to that drawing. From this point of view, relying on a 
judgment by Cesare Luporini concerning the fall «of the border, in Leo-
33 The reference is to an important essay by R. Nanni, «Osservazione, convenzione, 
ricomposizione nel paesaggio leonardiano del 1473», in: Raccolta Vinciana, xxviii, 1999, 
pp. 3-37.
30 31
leonardo da vinci on nature: knowledge and representationfabio frosini, alessandro nova
nardo, between drawing and painting and, consequently, also of the fall of 
the relationship between a preparatory drawing and the completed work 
to be delivered to the customer»34, Nova considers 8P a study of «natural 
phenomena during their transformation process. What we see before our 
eyes is therefore the result of a process».
The essay by Rodolfo Maffeis («Quasi dentatae rotae»: Leonardo disegna 
la Luna) is devoted to the relationship between vision and the various 
processes of visualisation – but from the point of view of the history of 
science – and concludes this section and the entire volume. In light of the 
ancient and medieval, the mythical, cosmological and metaphysical con-
ceptions of the moon, Maffeis examines in detail the notes that Leonardo 
makes concerning the nature of the moon during different periods of his 
work, and in particular those, in some way conclusive, expressed in Ms. F. 
Maffei’s approach is not oriented towards verifying whether Leonardo had 
anticipated later scientific developments or how many. In reality, Leonardo 
concludes – against the subsequently ascertained thesis – by arguing that 
the moon is covered by oceans and that lunar spots are due to land sur-
rounded by water. What matters, however, is on the one hand, the basic 
belief that guides his arguments, and on the other, his manner of debate. 
Concerning the former, Maffeis shows that Leonardo gives the moon the 
nature of «an earthly body with all the necessary basic prerogatives, in-
cluding water», thus breaking, in terms of methodology, with all previous 
traditions, which were then still very much alive. Concerning the latter, 
Maffeis documents how Leonardo makes his argument whilst always keep-
ing an eye on the «physical effects which would ensue from the theory». In 
reality, Leonardo «refuses to think in those terms» even before accepting 
or rejecting arguments by scholars such as Albert the Great. He «does not 
ignore theses and antitheses of medieval astronomy, but refuses to counter-
argue from a purely speculative position and looks for concrete evidence». 
Leonardo’s refusal to consider the moon as a rough and coarse surface, 
sandy and dusty (how Galileo later ‘saw’ and described it), an hypothesis 
which he even took into consideration in folio 310v of the Codex Atlan-
ticus (c. 1505-1508 ), and his choice of a moon covered with wavy oceans, 
certainly does not derive from the fear of going against the authority of 
those who believed the moon to be a perfect celestial body, but rather – 
and in this way we return to one of the starting points of this Introduction 
– from «a form of reasoning based on an analogical principle. Because of 
a comparison with our planet, where he could observe seas and lakes blaz-
ing with sunlight whilst this was absorbed by black earth and mountains 
covered with forests, Leonardo hypothesises an identical structure for the 
moon, stating that the dark parts – namely the famous spots – consisted 
of land lapped by shining seas». This analogy, which should be reiterated 
here, is only possible because of a sharp break from almost all the preced-
ing western cosmology and metaphysics.
* * *
9. The essays collected here do not exhaust the subject of Leonardo and 
Nature, but we will have achieved our purpose if they should help to foster 
continued interest in one of the central themes of research concerning 
Leonardo. All that remains at this point is to fulfil the very pleasant duty 
of expressing our thanks, in particular to Dario Donetti and Francesca 
Marzullo for their impeccable editorial work; to Linda Olenburg for col-
lecting all the image rights; to Stefano Grandi for the graphics and the 
layout; to Francesca Fiorani, who contributed to our discussions but could 
not deliver her written essay; to the chairs of the different sessions, and in 
particular to Paolo Galluzzi and Lea Dovev; and finally to Maja Haederli, 
Christine Klöckner and Mandy Richter for their invaluable skill in organ-
izing the practical aspects of the event.
34 C. Luporini, La mente di Leonardo, Firenze 1997 (1953: anastatic reprint), p. 124. 
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